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Assad regime in Syria. 
 
 
n 2011, President Obama proclaimed, “the 
time has come for President Assad to step 
aside” (“President Obama”). The question 
then becomes: why has the United States 
failed to act upon this declaration and been 
unsuccessful in achieving regime change in Syria? 
While there is evidence to suggest regime change 
is the ultimate goal in Syria, there has been a lack 
of action taken to facilitate the deposition of 
Assad. In this paper, there will be an emphasis on 
the policies and rhetoric that indicate the desire to 
catalyze a shift in governmental power through the 
disposal of the Assad regime. This approach will 
conceptualize the attempt to prove the 
discrepancies between the ideals of the United 
States and the actions taken by the nation. A 
historical approach will be employed to highlight 
the main policies, statements, and events which 
shaped the United States’ promotion of regime 
change in Syria. This approach will be organized 
by presidential terms, beginning with Obama’s 
first term, moving to his second term, and 
progressing towards Trump’s first term and the 
current state of affairs. This paper will 
consequently employ theories of foreign policy, to 
explain the Syrian situation from a theoretical 
standpoint. The theories of realism and liberalism 
will be employed while the ideals of both 
theoretical frameworks will be traced through 
foreign policy decisions, policies, and actions. 
Ultimately, these foreign policy theories will be 
rejected as the determining factor in the United 
States’ failure to pursue Syrian regime change.  
This paper will argue that public opinion is the 
most significant factor which has shaped United 
States’ foreign policy in Syria. Ultimately, the 
overwhelming public opposition to sustained 
military intervention will be isolated as the 
determining factor and analyzed in terms of 
affecting the foreign policy decisions of both 
President Obama and Trump. Numerous public 
opinion polls will be presented to conceptualize 
this phenomenon and explain the importance of 
the factor in the development of foreign policy. It 
will then be clear that public opinion is the answer 
to the question of United States inaction involving 
pursuing regime change in Syria.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Numerous political scientists have authored 
articles offering possible explanations for the 
inaction in U.S. foreign policy regarding regime 
change in Syria. These academics acknowledge the 
vast amount of evidence, which suggests foreign 
policy interests of intervention to facilitate the 
deposition of Assad. They highlight the 
discrepancies between theory and rhetoric, to 
underscore the inconsistency between the United 
States’ goals and foreign policy initiatives with 
instances of action which support these policies. 
Trent Mota introduces the claim that the theory of 
liberalism is responsible for the inconsistencies in 
his, “The Syria Problem” (Mota). Mota attributes 
the influence of liberalism as a theory of 
international relations, to the lack of military 
action taken in Syria. Specifically, he focuses upon 
Obama’s rejection of sustained military 
intervention in the Syrian conflict (Mota). Mota 
attributes the lack of action in Syria, to the fear of 
the Obama administration in incurring 
I 
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repercussions from direct military involvement. 
Seyyed-Abdolhamid Mirhosseini’s argument in his 
“Discursive double-legitimation of (avoiding) 
another war in Obama's 2013 address on Syria” 
similarly expands on this argument, unpacking the 
extent of the inaction in Syrian foreign policy 
(Mirhosseini). His argument also focuses on the 
policies of the Obama administration in 
conjunction with a discussion of liberalism. 
Mirhosseini discusses the influence of liberalism 
upon the Syrian conflict and U.S. foreign policy. 
Specifically, his paper focuses on the discrepancies 
between the realist rhetoric of President Obama in 
comparison to the liberal policies and actions 
which were enacted (Mirhosseini). Both authors 
analyze the prescriptions of liberalism and their 
effects on foreign policy, describing the basic 
ideological claims which conflict with the 
possibility of regime change.  
A large consensus in the literature attributes 
the survival of the Syrian regime to internal 
factors, such as the lack of opposition toward 
Assad’s rule as well as the inability for successful 
protests against the regime. Elie Elhadj is one 
writer who supports this claim as he articulates in 
his article, “Why Syria’s regime is likely to survive” 
(Elhadj). Elhadj acknowledges the necessity for a 
successful protest and rebellion period in order to 
catalyze a change in regime. He maintains that this 
necessary factor is unlikely to occur in Syria, 
presenting evidence that Syria will not experience 
a change in government (Elhadj). He cites the 
willingness of Syria’s security forces, or the Alawi 
community, to kill demonstrators in order to put 
down protests, as an example of the lack of 
possibility for a successful anti-regime movement 
(Elhadj). Daniel Byman’s article, “Regime Change 
in the Middle East: Problems and Prospects” 
presents a similar argument (Byman). Byman 
focuses on locating the differences between the 
Syrian situation when compared to other Arab 
countries with corrupt regimes. He identifies the 
ever-growing number of protests and protesters in 
Syria against external influence (including regime 
change) as one of the main factors (Byman). 
Specifically, Byman argues the demonstrations’ 
tendency to end in mass murder as one of the 
factors that makes the Syrian situation more 
distinct. His ultimate argument is that regimes, 
such as Syria’s, will be sensitive towards any 
foreign policy steps that might delegitimize their 
government (Byman). Bassam Haddad also 
reaches a similar conclusion in his article, “Syria’s 
Stalemate: The Limits of Regime Resilience” 
(Haddad). Haddad acknowledges the desire for 
regime change in the United States among other 
countries, but looks to the internal opposition in 
Syria to explain the reasons for delay. He 
maintains that the anti-intervention camp has 
grown due to the very possible reality that foreign 
military intervention would lead to total war 
(Haddad).  
Using a broader perspective, Nesam McMillan 
and David Mickler introduce the doctrines of the 
Responsibility to Protect and the International 
Criminal Court as explanations for the 
inconsistencies in regime changes, in their article 
“From Sudan to Syria: Locating ‘Regime Change’ 
in R2P and the ICC” (McMillan, Nesam and David 
Mickler). They propose that the inaction 
surrounding regime change in Syria, stems from 
the broader legal and political uncertainties of 
regime change in general. What constitutes 
legitimate regime change is the first question 
identified. The second major question concerns 
the relationship between traditions associated with 
sovereignty and global humanitarianism 
(McMillan, Nesam and David Mickler). Nesam 
and Mickler further attribute these discrepancies 
and questions the vagueness inherent in the R2P 
doctrine and the ICC statute. The ambiguity is also 
charged as the cause of problems in the practice of 
regime change, as well as for the legitimacy of the 
new government/ governing institutions. The 
incoherence in the doctrines, as well as the 
inability to reconcile the ambiguous doctrines 
between themselves, is further cited to explain the 
difference between past regime changes and Syria’s 
current situation (McMillan, Nesam and David 
Mickler).  
Randa Slim proposes a different analysis of the 
Syrian situation, in her article, “Hezbollah and 
Syria: From Regime Proxy to Regime Savior” 
(Slim). She looks to the longstanding ties between 
Hezbollah and the Syrian elite, specifically the 
House of Assad, in order to explain the United 
States’ policy, or lack thereof, regarding regime 
change (Slim). Slim argues that Hezbollah’s 
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immense presence in the region acts as a deterrent 
for the United States to pursue direct military 
action. The administration must consider the 
possible repercussions of waging war with Syria 
and Hezbollah, as unintended consequences of 
military action in Syria (Slim).  
Jason Brownlee, in his piece “…And Yet They 
persist: Explaining Survival and Transition in 
Neopatrimonial Regimes” introduces the 
argument of patrimonial authority and the 
strength to resist regime change, which is inherent 
in some governments (Brownlee). He uses the 
variable “hard-liner” strength to measure the 
relationship between certain regimes and foreign 
influence (Brownlee 36). Utilizing the case studies 
of Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Tunisia, Brownlee 
concludes that the endurance of the regimes can 
be attributed to the ability of authoritarian 
incumbents to underscore opposition movements, 
when unimpeded by foreign influence (Brownlee). 
Therefore, Brownlee attributes the success of 
regime changes to an undermined patrimonial 
network. Because Syria’s patrimonial regime has 
flourished, despite foreign efforts, Brownlee argues 
the regime can and will continue to sustain itself, 
excluding the possibility of regime change efforts 
by the United States (Brownlee). 
 
UNDERSTANDING THE SYRIAN SITUATION 
The 2011 Arab Spring uprisings led to the 
beginning of the conflict in Syria, as anti-
authoritarian forces advocating for the adoption of 
democracy formed in countries across the Middle 
East (Al Jazeera). In Syria, the formation of anti-
Assad rebel groups addressed the crippling 
economy as well as the lack of freedom and human 
rights under the dictatorship. The Assad regime 
responded to the democratic movements, with 
violence, destruction, and the abuse of human 
rights (Al Jazeera). The formation of the leading 
anti-Assad rebel group, the Free Syrian Army, led 
to the rise of tensions between the government and 
rebel groups, resulting in the Syrian Civil War (Al 
Jazeera). The initial civil war has evolved into a 
large-scale conflict involving international powers, 
religion, terrorism, and humanitarian crises. The 
creation of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
are examples of the extreme response to the 
conflict and destruction between the Syrian rebel 
forces and the Syrian government (Al Jazeera). 
Currently, the extent of the United States’ military 
intervention in Syria is solely focused on 
destroying ISIS, removed from the pursuit of 
regime change or shifting the balance of power in 
the region (Al Jazeera). 
The United States’ primary motivation for 
supporting Syrian rebel groups is the promotion of 
democracy and the destruction of authoritarian 
regimes, specifically Assad’s rule in Syria (“Syrian 
Civil War.”). The United States was founded on 
core democratic beliefs such as sovereignty, 
liberty, and freedoms- rights which are secured 
within the Constitution. The inherent liberalism of 
the nation emphasizes the desire for promotion of 
rights and liberties, through the practice of 
democratic promotion. In response to the 
depravation of rights and corrupt authoritarian 
governments in other countries, the United States 
has championed democratic promotion (through 
processes ranging from securing free elections to 
the installation of new democracies) (Stuster). The 
United States has supported other rebel groups 
and facilitated the regime changes in other 
countries involved in the Arab Spring uprisings, 
including Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Yemen. In a 
broader analysis of the world, the United States 
has overseen the military coups of other 
governments throughout history (Stuster). Some 
of these countries include Brazil, Chile, the Congo, 
the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Iran, and 
South Vietnam. While many of these instances of 
political intervention were carried out through 
covert CIA operations, the United States has a 
proven pattern in regards to deposing of brutal 
dictatorships and installing pro-American, 
democratic governments (Stuster). Since the 
operations, the United States has taken credit and 
publicly acknowledged the actions and 
depositions, ultimately championing the spread of 
democracy and rights (Stuster). This historical 
precedent paved the way for the United States’ 
intervention in the Syrian civil war and in 
deposing the Assad regime.  
The Syrian civil war has sparked action from 
the international community, including 
international organizations such as the UN, as well 
as other countries. The regime’s violence against 
its citizens has prompted not only the United 
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States, but the United Nations to impose 
punishments upon the country (“Syrian Civil 
War.”). International interference has been 
necessary to respond to the imprisonment, torture, 
and murder of protesters, as well as the use of 
chemical weapons against civilians in Syria. The 
international community has also responded 
through the alliance with the rebel groups as well 
as the Syrian government (“Syrian Civil War.”). 
Specifically, the United States has provided 
support, both politically and militarily, to the rebel 
Syrian forces as a representation of its censure of 
the dictatorship (“A Look at US Involvement in 
Syria.”). Assad’s regime is supported politically 
and militarily by both Russia and Iran. Groups 
such as Hezbollah, ISIS, and the Russian army 
have sided with Assad and supported the 
government in the Syrian conflict (Al Jazeera). 
While there are influences and opposing forces 
within Syria, the international community and 
external influences present in the region also 
contribute to the totality of the conflict. 
The humanitarian crisis in Syria further 
constitutes a larger reason for the United States’ 
interference in the country, invoking the 
Responsibility to Protect (“A Look at US 
Involvement in Syria.”). The Responsibility to 
Protect has been signed by numerous countries, 
mostly those comprising the United Nations, and 
constitutes a global commitment for aid in the face 
of atrocities. The four key concerns that it 
addresses include preventing genocide, ethnic 
cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity (“Responsibility to Protect.”). 
Ultimately, the doctrine is centered around 
violations of human rights and mass atrocities. 
While it is considered a measure of last resort, in 
the face of a country in violation of any or all of 
the four key concerns, action is seen as legally 
required and permissible (“Responsibility to 
Protect.”). Assad’s use of chemical weapons is a 
direct violation of the key concerns of the doctrine, 
warranting an international response. 
Consequently, the United Nations has been an 
active mediator in the Syrian crisis, and the United 
States has followed suit in most situations, helping 
to impose and enforce economic sanctions and 
military intervention (“Syrian Civil War.”). 
However, due to international disagreement, 
larger scale intervention consisting of Syrian 
occupation by multiple nations, has been 
prevented. While R2P has been used to rationalize 
regime change, for example in the case of Libya, 
the doctrine has not been utilized effectively in 
Syria (“Responsibility to Protect.”). In theory, the 
doctrine could be used to justify larger- scale 
military operations in Syria, in order to prevent 
the mass atrocities and violations of human rights. 
Because of the precedent of using R2P to justify 
regime change, it is also quite possible to use the 
doctrine to facilitate the deposition of Assad. 
The United States has responded to the threats 
of terrorism, specifically regarding ISIS and its 
reign in Syria, through military intervention in 
Syria. However, despite the numerous reasons 
which would justify the forced removal of the 
Assad regime, Assad’s dictatorship has survived.  
 
THE PRESIDENCY OF BARACK OBAMA  
Over the course of President Obama’s 
presidencies, there were numerous factors which 
suggested the United States’ foreign policy goal in 
Syria was regime change. The Syrian conflict 
peaked during his presidencies, in terms of actual 
physical conflict, the international community’s 
concern, public concern and media coverage (“The 
Syrian Conflict”). There was a heightened sense of 
expectancy for the President to exert his power 
and influence over Syria in order to either resolve 
the conflict or take action in order to mediate the 
situation. Examples of the President’s own actions 
and promises that would suggest regime change 
include Obama’s protest for Assad to step down 
from power, the declaration of his “red line” 
doctrine, and the pursuit of military airstrikes on 
the region (“A Look at US Involvement in Syria.”). 
His own administration included many outspoken 
influences in the creation of foreign policy, or 
those advocating for the overthrow of the Syrian 
regime. Despite these aspects of his presidencies 
which suggested there would be a strong influence 
pushing for regime change, very little action was 
taken. While the United States did pursue punitive 
measures upon the regime for the abuse of human 
rights, the Obama administration exercised very 
limited military intervention (“Foreign Policy of 
the Barack Obama Administration.”). Obama’s 
declared goal of regime change was very limitedly 
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pursued during his administration and ultimately 
left in the past after his presidential terms. 
 In 2011, leaders of numerous countries around 
the world, including Angela Merkel of Germany 
and David Cameron of the United Kingdom called 
on Assad to resign from power in Syria. Barack 
Obama followed suit and formally called on Assad 
to “step down ‘for the sake of the Syrian people’” 
(“Foreign Policy of the Barack Obama 
Administration.”). The demand for Assad’s 
resignation influenced public opinion and shaped 
the official foreign policy agenda. In 2012, Obama 
referred to Assad’s use of chemical weapons 
against his own people as a “red line” (“A Look at 
US Involvement in Syria.”). The “red line” 
doctrine labeled the transportation or use of 
chemical weapons by the Syrian government as 
cause for military intervention by the United 
States. The ultimatum acted as a threat of force to 
the Assad regime, as the administration could 
either cooperate and prevent further chemical 
weapons attacks in Syria or refuse to submit and 
face military consequences (“A Look at US 
Involvement in Syria.”). Obama was pressured to 
act on his “red line” doctrine in August of 2013, 
following the chemical weapons attacks on rebels 
in Damascus, resulting in the death of nearly 1,500 
citizens (Mayer). Obama responded with a 
proposal for limited military intervention, which 
he presented before Congress. However, Obama 
faced Congressional dissent, provoking him to 
reevaluate his options, including military 
involvement (Mayer). Presented with two courses 
of action concerning the destruction of chemical 
weapons in Syria: the first choice of utilizing 
military force through airstrikes or the second of 
pursuing diplomatic negotiations to more 
effectively reduce the abundancy of chemical 
weapons, Obama favored the second approach (“A 
Look at US Involvement in Syria.”). While acting 
in accordance with his “red line” doctrine would 
have meant the pursuit of the first military 
approach, Obama defaulted to the pursuit of 
cooperation, going against his rhetoric which 
suggested military involvement.  
 Under President Obama, the United States 
began supporting the Free Syrian Army, or the 
rebel forces opposed  Assad’s dictatorship, another 
example which suggest the United States’ desire to 
conduct military operations in Syria (“A Look at 
US Involvement in Syria.”). The objective of the 
Free Syrian army was to depose Assad through 
armed operations (“The Syrian Conflict”). The 
army was largely constructed and supported by 
foreign actors, including the United States. 
Security officials from the United States, alongside 
officials from other countries, facilitated the 
election of military commanders and 
representatives in the army (“Foreign Policy of the 
Barack Obama Administration.”). Along with 
elections, the United States sent officials to train 
these officers in military strategies and tactics. The 
Obama administration also provided weapons, 
artillery and financial aid to the rebel groups 
(“Foreign Policy of the Barack Obama 
Administration.”). Later, the creation of the New 
Syrian Army, a rebel group branching from the 
Free Syrian Army, further presented an 
opportunity for military intervention and regime 
change in Syria (“The Syrian Conflict”). While the 
forces eventually dissolved and formed the 
Revolutionary Commando Army, many of the 
commanders and soldiers of the army previously 
received training from the United States’ military. 
The United States’ role in supporting and leading 
the opposition groups to Assad’s regime, would 
suggest the United States’ goal was concurrent 
with the rebel groups. The rebel groups specifically 
formed in order to oversee the deposition of 
Assad, meaning the United States recognized and 
assumed this goal when military officials chose to 
support the Free Syrian Army. However, while the 
Obama administration took extensive measures to 
ensure these groups would be prepared and 
organized to prove effective in their opposition to 
Assad, Obama never acted further upon regime 
change.   
 Numerous notable officials comprising the 
Obama administration advocated for military 
intervention as an introduction to a more active 
role for the United States in Syria, as they 
attempted to facilitate Syrian regime change. One 
of the strongest condemnations of the Assad 
regime came from Obama’s Secretary of State, 
Hillary Clinton (“Foreign Policy of the Barack 
Obama Administration.”). Clinton advocated for 
larger scale military operations in Syria during 
Obama’s terms, and has continued to be a vocal 
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proponent of sustained military intervention, 
denouncing the legitimacy of the Syrian 
government. Obama’s first two defense secretaries, 
Robert M. Gates and Leon E. Panetta, heralded the 
opposition to Obama’s retracted foreign policy, 
arguing he was attempting to micromanage the 
military (“Foreign Policy of the Barack Obama 
Administration.”). They advocated for the greater 
allowance of power to the military to carry out 
operatives in Syria, to further advance the process 
of deposing Assad. Obama’s third defense 
secretary, Chuck Hagel, furthered this trend as a 
vocal proponent of military attacks against Assad 
(Bertrand). Hagel proposed numerous plans for 
military strikes and intervention, which were all 
consequently struck down by Obama (Bertrand). 
Hagel was frequently recorded stating that the 
United States was ready to take military action 
once the orders were given, clearly indicating the 
discrepancy between military personnel and the 
Commander in Chief- President Obama 
(Bertrand). Hagel objected to a mass ground 
deployment, and instead argued for a limited 
military engagement, in an attempt to persuade 
even the non-interventionists aligning with 
Obama (“Foreign Policy of the Barack Obama 
Administration.”). He believed that even this 
limited form of military action, which did not 
require mass deployment of American troops, 
could shift the balance of power against Assad and 
towards the rebel groups (“Foreign Policy of the 
Barack Obama Administration.”). He further 
pursued two different options in order to facilitate 
this change in power dynamics: arming the rebel 
groups against Assad, or using military strikes 
directed at the Syrian air force. Hagel argued either 
option would facilitate regime change from Assad 
to the rebel power groups, without requiring a full-
scale invasion on behalf of the United States 
(Bertrand). While these options were heralded by 
Hagel and other advisors within the Obama 
administration, the policies were rejected by the 
President.  
 To understand the discrepancy between 
President Obama and some of his most prominent 
administrators, it is necessary to understand his 
role in shaping foreign policy. Tony Badran, a 
Middle Eastern researcher, explained the 
overarching role President Obama played in 
shaping foreign policy toward Syria. Badran 
argues, “‘the US Syria policy has always been in the 
head of one man, and one man only: Barack 
Obama’” (Bertrand). He further explains Obama’s 
intentions, arguing he “‘never intended to remove 
Assad’”, explaining the United States’ foreign 
policy as a reflection of this bias (Bertrand). 
Obama exercised his assumed executive power, by 
retaining the most influence in shaping American 
foreign policy (Bertrand). While these officials 
were influential components of Obama’s 
administration, they were ultimately unsuccessful 
in gaining the support of President Obama. 
Obama’s rejection of simply entertaining the idea 
of regime change, barred the existence of his 
administrator’s opinions influencing his foreign 
policy (Bertrand). This key factor explains the 
discrepancy between the opinions of the personnel 
comprising the Obama administration, and the 
concrete policies of the United States (Bertrand). 
However, the explanation of Obama’s use of non-
interventionist policy despite the majority 
opinions of his advisors and administration, 
requires a more expansive understanding of the 
role of liberalism in Obama’s determination of his 
foreign policy ideals. 
 President Obama’s stance toward military 
intervention and the pursuit of regime change in 
Syria, was heavily influenced by the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. The long-lasting wars, the 
overwhelming commitment made by the United 
States’ military in both of these countries, and the 
long-lasting effects of the wars, shaped the United 
States as a whole, not excluding the foreign policy 
of the presidential administration (Woodward). 
President Obama’s speech concerning military 
strikes against Syria acknowledged these 
precedents while reflecting upon the effects of the 
conflicts. He explained his resistance towards 
intervention as he had previously “resisted calls for 
military action [in Syria] because we cannot 
resolve someone else’s civil war through force” a 
conclusion he came to “after a decade of war in 
Iraq and Afghanistan” (Staff, Washington Post). 
Using the hindsight acquired after the United 
States’ invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, Obama 
feared a military invasion of Syria would lead to a 
similar situation in another Middle Eastern 
country. He also reflected upon the mass casualties 
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and sacrifices made by the U.S. military in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, again understanding the 
implications of the wars and failures (Woodward). 
Due to this history, Obama was precise with his 
actions and policies in order to prevent any 
prolonged conflict as he promised the American 
people he “[would] not pursue an open-ended 
action like Iraq or Afghanistan” (Staff, 
Washington Post). Regime change in Syria would 
most definitely classify itself as “open-ended 
conflict”, explaining the lack of action in that 
regard, due to fear of intervention leading to war 
(Staff, Washington Post). Therefore, Obama’s 
subsequent foreign policy concerning the Middle 
East was largely based on nonintervention. His 
tendency to favor inaction over intervention later 
extended to his foreign policy decisions in Syria. 
Because President Obama could be described as a 
liberal non-interventionist after the invasions of 
Iraq and Afghanistan, the policies the United 
States embraced during his presidency coincided 
with the foreign policy theory of liberalism 
(Woodward). 
 Liberalism helped shaped United States’ 
foreign policy during the Obama administration 
emphasizing the sue of negotiation and 
cooperation over the exercise of military power. 
Regime change by the United States would require 
a large-scale military invasion and sustained 
intervention, or mass troop deployment. The 
emphasis on power and military in either of these 
situations, contrast with the ideals of President 
Obama. While he responded to public pressure 
when initiating his “red line” doctrine as well as 
airstrikes in order to enforce his previous 
assertions, he largely fell back from direct military 
action or intervention “Foreign Policy of the 
Barack Obama Administration.”). He repeatedly 
argued that there was “no military solution” to the 
Syrian conflict, continuing to advocate for a 
diplomatic settlement between the international 
powers (Mota). 
 The purpose of the declaration was to 
immediately address the concerns of the 
international community as well at the other 
prominent interventionists in the president’s 
administration. Obama’s true beliefs heralded 
liberalism and its emphasis on non-military 
answers. At the time in which he declared the “red 
line’ in Syria, the only option available to President 
Obama presented itself as the use of force to enact 
punitive measures (“Foreign Policy of the Barack 
Obama Administration.”). However, a few days 
after Obama gave his ‘red line” speech, Russian 
President Vladimir Putin, offered to negotiate 
diplomacy between the United States and Syria 
(Mayer). Obama weighed the two options at hand, 
but ultimately chose to pursue diplomatic 
negotiations alongside Putin and Assad. His 
decision can largely be explained by the influence 
of his subscription to liberalism. While there may 
seem to be a discrepancy in the initiates of 
president Obama in Syria, it is clear that once the 
option of resolving the situation no longer 
involved direct military aggression on behalf of the 
United States, Obama was more inclined to agree 
to the summits and treaties (Mayer). 
 The G20 Summit was held between Putin and 
Obama to discuss the international control of 
Syrian chemical weapons. On September 14 of 
2013, the “Framework for the Elimination of 
Syrian Chemical Weapons” was finalized and 
published (“Foreign Policy of the Barack Obama 
Administration.”). This international treaty 
resulted from United States- Russian negotiations, 
or a reliance on the international system, to 
provide safety and security in Syria. This 
document called for Assad to eliminate Syria’s 
chemical weapons stockpiles by June of 2014 
(“Foreign Policy of the Barack Obama 
Administration.”). The United States also relied on 
the power of the United Nations Security Council 
and its resolutions, in order to achieve its goals 
concerning the humanitarian crisis in Syria, 
without pursuing regime change. The UN Security 
Council Resolution 2118, stipulated that Syria 
would assume responsibility for the destruction of 
its chemical weapons as well as the chemical 
weapons facilities. The UN laid out an 
implementation plan requiring Syrian officials 
adherence to time restrictions and guidelines 
concerning the elimination of the administrations’ 
weapons (“Foreign Policy of the Barack Obama 
Administration.”). The diplomatic negotiations led 
to Syria’s introduction to the Chemical Weapons 
Convention as well as Assad’s cooperation with 
the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons. The use of the international system and 
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diplomatic negotiations further proves the 
tendency for Obama’s ideals to align with 
liberalism. 
 Liberalism’s emphasis on cooperation over the 
use of military force or action, further explains 
Obama’s decision to move from pursuing military 
intervention in Syria to embracing more peaceful, 
non-violent approaches. Obama supported 
political and diplomatic negotiations, not only in 
Syria, but these ideals were seen throughout his 
foreign policy initiatives in other countries as well. 
While the members of his administration arguing 
for direct military intervention, subscribed to the 
theory of realism, Obama’s liberal ideals directly 
conflicted with the prescriptions of realism. This 
explains why Obama chose the latter of his two 
present options in shaping foreign policy in Syria, 
as the negotiations coincided with a liberal 
approach. The G20 Summit and the United States- 
Russian led negotiations were both examples of the 
utilization of the international system as well as 
the liberal tendency to promote non-
interventionism. Liberalism emphasizes the use of 
international organizations and treaties, as these 
institutions can be effectively utilized in order to 
reduce anarchy in the international system. The 
key concept of cooperation helps underscore the 
importance of the use of these organizations, as 
states’ actions can be mediated and manipulated 
through the use of negotiations and diplomacy. 
President Obama understood that the possibility 
for peaceful negotiations was superior to military 
intervention, as successful treaties would result in 
a much larger reduction of chemical weapons in 
Syria as opposed to inaccurate or potentially fatal 
airstrikes (Mayer).  
 While Obama’s ideological preferences 
regarding theories of foreign policy, can be 
isolated as the contributing factor to preventing 
the United States from pursuing regime change, 
the case differs regarding Trump’s presidency. 
Trump heralds the foreign policy theory of 
realism, as he emphasizes the use of power and the 
power dynamics inherent in the international 
system. Due to the fact that Trump does not 
subscribe to liberalism, there must be another 
answer to explain the question of failure in 
pursuing Syrian regime change.  
 
THE PRESIDENCY OF DONALD TRUMP 
While United States’ foreign policy under 
President Obama was largely influenced through 
his adherence to liberalism, it has adapted to 
accommodate the ideals of President Trump. Due 
to President Trump’s rejection of the theory of 
liberalism, he subsequently rejects liberal non 
interventionism, the policy which was hailed by 
Obama during his presidencies. In opposition, 
Trump’s foreign policy is largely characterized by 
the theory of realism. Realism is the theory of 
international relations which emphasizes national 
interests, the role of the state and military power in 
world politics. President Trump’s subscription to 
this theory explains his emphasis on states as the 
primary actors in the international system, his 
rejection of international organizations and the 
emphasis on hard power. While Trump’s realist 
paradigm directly contradicts Obama’s liberal 
paradigm, the policies of both administrations are 
surprisingly similar with regard to the Syrian 
crisis. 
The Trump administration has been criticized 
for the lack of written, concise policies regarding 
the Syrian conflict (Krieg). While Trump has not 
formally declared his objectives in Syria, “the 
various foreign policy U-turns over the past four 
months suggest that there is no U.S. global 
strategy, let alone a strategy for the Middle East” 
(Krieg 145). This indicates that there has not been 
a clear strategy to which the Trump administration 
has relied upon in its proceedings with Syria. An 
explanation of this phenomenon relies upon an 
understanding of Trump’s “America First” policy, 
with its strict focus on domestic policies as 
opposed to foreign policy has many implications, 
specifically on the crisis in Syria (Krieg). This 
policy is largely centered around the notion that 
the United States must first solidify its strength at 
home before it is able to shift its focus abroad. This 
explains Trump’s focus on domestic policies in 
areas such as economics and trade within these 
first years of his administration. While many 
believed that Trump’s repetition of “America 
First” and “Make America Great Again” would 
result in a strictly isolationist foreign policy, 
Trump’s subscription to realism has prevented this 
isolationist perspective (Krieg). While there is still 
a lack of physical, written policy, Trump’s ideals 
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can be inferred from his foreign policy 
interactions.  
Syrian foreign policy under President Trump 
is focused upon two distinct goals. The first goal 
concerns fighting and destroying the presence of 
ISIS in the region, as well as crippling the entire 
organization itself (Krieg). One of the few foreign 
policy issues Trump addressed in his campaign for 
President was ISIS, which he deemed his primary 
foreign policy objective. The second goal the 
administration has outlined is resolving the 
chemical weapons violations of the Assad regime. 
Many of the strikes against the Syrian government 
have been to address this issue, provoking 
international action as well (Krieg). Because the 
Trump administration has only explored these two 
goals in Syria, regime change has been completely 
swept under the rug. The administration’s goals 
are confined to the anti-terrorism and human 
rights objectives, barring the existence of 
conversation, let alone policy, regarding regime 
change in Syria (Niva). Currently, terrorism is the 
forefront issue, whether that changes in the future 
due to successful attacks against ISIS, could 
possibly change the current situation of the Assad 
regime (Niva).  
 The Trump administration’s policies 
regarding the United States military as well as the 
ideals concerning power are in accordance with 
Trump’s subscription to the foreign policy theory 
of realism. Trump champions the use of hard 
power, such as aggressive displays of military 
might, and the use of threat. President Trump 
emphasizes the importance of America retaining 
its position as “the world’s preeminent military 
power” (Popescu 98). In order to solidify this 
position he has advocated for the “rebuilding and 
modernizing” of the military which previously had 
been obstructed by Obama’s liberal leanings 
(Popescu 98). Trump has called for an increase in 
military spending, in order to continue the build-
up of the army. The budget for defense spending is 
one of the largest allocations of spending money 
the military has ever seen (Popescu). Trump is a 
firm believer in the existence of an expansive, well-
maintained military, and the large amount of 
spending devoted to the military will allow for the 
solidification of power and ability. This action not 
only acts as a display of power, but its shifts the 
balance of power in favor of the United States 
when compared to the Islamic State, as the U.S. 
has more military might (Popsecu).  
Trump’s emphasis on power can also be seen 
through the increased military strikes in Syria. 
“Conventional bombing and drone strikes have 
significantly increased under Trump” with the goal 
of targeting and eradicating ISIS from the region 
(Niva 3). President Trump’s policy concerning 
Syria is often referred to as “annihilation tactics” 
due to the large-scale attacks as well as the 
frequency of these military strikes (Niva 3). Trump 
has already dropped a record number of bombs on 
the Middle East, specifically Syria, increasing by 
roughly 10 percent when compared to his 
predecessors (Niva). The two major airstrikes 
conducted under the Trump administration to 
date, were the April 2017 and April 2018 attacks.  
In April 2017, the United States received 
reports of chemical weapon attacks in Douma, 
Syria. The reports showed signs of exposure to 
chlorine and sarin gas, resulting in the death of 
dozens of civilians, including women and children 
(“Syrian Civil War.”). While Syria and Russia 
denied any involvement in the attack, the 
horrifying images and casualty reports from the 
attacks provoked an international response 
(“Syrian Civil War.”). The importance of the 
chemical attack was underscored due to the 
Obama administration’s diplomatic efforts 
alongside Russia to shut down the weapons 
facilities and destroy the remaining chemical 
weapons in Syria. The ability of the Assad regime 
to carry out the attacks emphasized the failure of 
the previous administration to hinder Assad’s 
chemical weapons power, or to successfully deter 
his further actions (“Syrian Civil War”). Trump 
recognized these discrepancies, catalyzing his 
decision to resort to the exercise of military power. 
On Friday, April 7 of 2017, the Trump 
administration delivered multiple attacks in 
response to the use of chemical weapons by the 
Assad regime (“Syrian Civil War.”). The targets of 
the missiles were associated with the chemical 
weapons program of Syria, including a scientific 
research center as well as a chemical weapons 
storage facility. The United States fired 59 TLAMs, 
or Tomahawk cruise missiles at these facilities and 
in the specific areas in order to emphasize the 
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objective of the attacks as well as create the most 
possible consequences for Assad concerning his 
violation of international law (“Syrian Civil War”). 
On April 14th of 2018, the United States alongside 
France and the United Kingdom, launched more 
airstrikes against the Assad regime in response to 
subsequent chemical weapons attacks on Syrian 
civilians (“Syrian Civil War.”). The reports 
detailed a chemical attack on a Damascus suburb. 
Once again, the attack zones were limited to those 
associated with the construction, development, or 
holding of chemical weapons (“Syrian Civil 
War.”).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
The military strikes conducted by the United 
States on the Assad regime were defended on the 
basis of two objectives of intervention. The first 
objective was to impose a punishment on the 
Assad regime for the chemical weapons attacks. 
The second objective was to deter Assad from 
using chemical weapons once again in future 
attacks. Trump was determined to strategically use 
the strikes to impair Assad’s ability to continue 
producing chemical weapons, as well as possibly 
prevent him from exercising future attacks upon 
his civilian population (“ 
Syrian Civil War”). He vocalized these goals in an 
address to the public which he stated that the 
attacks were carried out in order “to establish a 
strong deterrent against the production, spread 
and use of chemical weapons” by the Assad regime 
(“Statement by President Trump on Syria”). The 
second round of airstrikes carried out in 2018, 
were designed to inflict much more damage than 
the 2017 attacks, due to Assad’s persistence in the 
usage of chemical weapon warfare (“Syrian Civil 
War”). The increased use of missiles reflects this 
change in attitude, as the attacks were no longer 
solely for the purpose of installing fear at the 
hands of a threat, but to cripple Assad’s forces. 
However, the strikes were limited in their 
objectives, to focusing upon the use of chemical 
weapons in Syria. The strikes were not designed or 
carried out to facilitate the deposition of Assad, or 
even to aid the rebel groups against the regime. 
The strikes, in theory, and in practice, were 
targeted to answering the question of chemical 
warfare and providing repercussions for the Assad 
regime. 
When commenting on the extent of the 
United States retaliation against the Assad regime, 
Trump contended that the United States would be 
“prepared to sustain this response until the Syrian 
regime stops its use of prohibited chemical agents” 
(“Statement by President Trump on Syria”). When 
asked if the United States through the Trump 
administration would pursue any further action in 
Syria after the military strikes, Defense Secretary, 
Jim Mattis, focused his answer on the subsequent 
actions of the Assad regime. He stated that the 
United States’ future actions would “depend on 
Mr. Assad should he decide to use more chemical 
weapons in the future” (“Briefing by Secretary 
Mattis on U.S. Strikes in Syria.”). These answers 
reveal two very significant factors in 
understanding the foreign policy initiatives of the 
Trump administration regarding Syria. The first 
factor is the focus on the chemical weapons issue 
in Syria. The second is the reactive policy, as 
opposed to a proactive foreign policy. Because the 
goals of the administration are clearly aligned and 
have been specifically highlighted, it is possible to 
understand the lack of U.S. military action 
regarding Syrian regime change. The Trump 
administration is not attempting to pursue 
military action to provoke regime change, but 
rather to punish the Syrian government for the 
violation of human rights through the chemical 
weapons attacks against Syrian citizens.  
While the Trump administration has not shied 
away from pursuing military intervention and 
initiatives against ISIS in Syria, it has not utilized 
these same initiatives in its interactions with 
Assad. “Inaction”, the word, which best describes 
United States foreign policy regarding regime 
change in Syria, cannot be used to describe the 
majority of foreign policy initiatives of President 
Trump. This inherent discrepancy between 
Trump’s foreign policy regarding ISIS and the lack 
of action taken to facilitate the deposition of 
Assad, provokes a question into the cause of the 
inconsistencies. While liberalism has been rejected 
as the answer to understanding this discrepancy, 
there must be another viable answer to 
understanding this phenomenon. In light of this 
rejection, this paper will turn towards isolating the 
consistent variable in both President Obama and 
Trump’s administrations.  
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DETERMINING FACTOR 
One of the consistent factors between both of the 
Obama presidencies and the Trump presidency to 
date, is public opinion regarding United States 
intervention in Syria. During all three presidential 
terms, a majority of the public opinion polls 
indicated a strong resistance to military 
intervention. These polls and charts will be 
presented in order to analyze the correlation 
between public opinion and the actions taken by 
the United States military as well the effects on the 
policies of the presidential administrations. 
 Much of the public opposition to military 
intervention in Syria can be ascribed to the 
previous wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the 
height of the Syrian crisis, these past wars were still 
fresh in the minds of American citizens, biasing 
them against any actions of the United States 
which could possibly lead to yet another war or 
prolonged conflict (“The Syrian Dilemma”).  “so 
much of the aversion to intervention…has been 
predicated on Syria’s supposed similarity to Iraq 
and fear of entering into another quagmire” (“The 
Syria Dilemma” 24). This constant fear in 
Americans’ minds partially explains the 
overwhelming opposition to any military 
intervention in Syria. The mishaps and extended 
stays in both Iraq and Afghanistan hurt the 
public’s reliance on the U.S. government to 
provide limited assistance without mass 
deployment. Therefore, not only was the public 
biased against small scale operations in Syria, but 
the full-scale military invasion needed to facilitate 
the deposition of Assad was completely off the 
table. 
The influence of public approval can be seen 
in President Obama’s request for congressional 
authorization to approve the airstrikes in Syria. 
Mayer describes the power of the President as 
commander-in-chief, and his ability to conduct 
the airstrikes in Syria without asking for a formal 
certification of approval (Mayer). She refers to 
Obama’s action as “unprecedented” as “there are 
no other instances of a President asking for 
advance congressional approval for an attack of 
this scale” (Mayer 827). This significant request by 
the President further emphasizes the importance 
he placed upon public and administrative approval 
for military intervention in Syria. This request is 
even more significant as during this time in the 
Syrian conflict, the public was more intensely 
biased against conducting strikes. In fact, The 
Washington Post found that there were “263 
House members against or leaning against, and 
only 25 expressing public support” for the strikes, 
while in the Senate the count was “23 in favor and 
43 against or leaning against” (Mayer). This 
overwhelming disapproval towards the strikes 
accurately represents the American public’s 
opposition to military intervention in Syria as well. 
In response to Obama’s proposal for airstrikes he 
stated that he was “also mindful that I’m the 
president of the world’s oldest constitutional 
democracy”, explaining the core liberal policies 
which largely influenced his decisions and inaction 
(Staff, Washington Post). This also explains his 
reliance on Congressional approval instead of the 
use of his executive power as commander-in-chief. 
While President Obama could potentially have 
ordered the military airstrikes on Syria without the 
assent of the House or Senate, his devotion to the 
democratic process led to his proposal to 
Congress. This emphasis on democracy also 
explains the subsequent hesitancy displayed by 
President Obama in suggesting military 
interference in Syria, as after the proposal failed, 
Obama looked for alternative solutions to the 
conflict.  
 The Brookings Institution published an 
expansive survey regarding the American public’s 
attitudes toward Syria, specifically focusing on 
ISIS. The study was conducted with a sample of 
1008 American adults in November of 2014, 
during Obama’s second term (Telhami). Some of 
the key findings of the surveys concluded that 
Americans also perceived ISIS as the biggest threat 
in the Middle East, and therefore the expected 
forefront foreign policy issue of the U.S. 
(Telhami). The survey also found that if the 
airstrikes conducted by the international 
community, including the United States, failed to 
destroy ISIS, a majority of those polled would still 
oppose deploying ground forces in Syria. The 
graph below represents the poll results of the 
question, showing that 57% of the sample size 
opposed sending troops into Syria, with the 
objective of fighting ISIS (Telhami). This specific 
graph also shows the discrepancies between 
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Republicans and Democrats with regard to 
favoring or opposing military intervention.  
 
The Brookings Institute  
 
 
   
 The survey asked follow-up questions 
regarding military operations in Syria, and the 
removal of the Assad regime. The Brookings 
Institute found that Americans were ultimately 
opposed to any military operations with “72% 
opposing and 25% supporting such operations” 
(Telhami). While there were strong anti-Assad 
sentiments expressed throughout the questions, 
both parties came to very similar conclusions 
regarding United States military action.  
Gallup conducted a public opinion poll in 
September of 2013, asking questions related to 
United States foreign policy, with a focus on the 
Syrian conflict. The poll was taken among 1,038 
American adults in all of the 50 states. The poll 
followed President Obama’s speech regarding the 
chemical weapons stockpiles in Syria, detailing 
possible plans to supervise the Assad regime and 
ensure the destruction of the chemical weapons 
(“A Look at US Involvement in Syria.”). The 
survey was conducted twice, within the span of a 
week. Within this week, the survey found that the 
public’s opposition to military strikes in Syria had 
risen from “51%” to “62%” (Gallup, Inc). The 
survey also found that the support for military 
intervention in Syria dropped from “36% to 28%” 
within that same week (Gallup, Inc). 
 
Gallup, Inc.      
 This poll highlights the complicated nature of 
the American public’s reactions and opinions 
regarding the Syrian conflict. The public’s views 
are both impressionable and dynamic as within a 
week, support and opposition numbers fluctuated 
in response to the unfolding events. However, 
while fluctuation in inevitable, the poll highlights 
the overwhelming opposition to military 
intervention. 
 A poll conducted this past April by CBS News 
surveyed 1,006 American adults concerning 
Trump’s foreign policy in Syria (CBS News). 
When asked “How far are you willing to see the 
U.S. go in Syria” only 18% responded with ground 
troops and a full-scale military invasion (CBS 
News). While there was much more support 
amongst those polled for airstrikes, when 
compared to those polls presented previously 
during Obama’s administration, there is not 
overwhelming public support for military 
involvement.  
 
CBS News 
 
Democratic involvement and representation is 
emphasized in the next question presented by the 
poll. When asked “Do you think it is necessary for 
Congress to approve any further U.S. military 
action in Syria, or do you think Donald Trump has 
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the authority to take further military action in 
Syria without getting approval of Congress?” the 
results were as followed (CBS News). 
 
CBS News  
 
Seven in ten Americans underscore the 
necessity for Trump to receive authorization from 
Congress before pursuing further action in Syria 
(CBS News). This poll indicates the American 
public’s emphasis on representation of views and 
the democratic process. While President Trump 
has the power of commander-in-chief and can 
potentially initiate attacks on Syria without the 
approval of Congress or the public, Americans are 
highly opposed to this option (CBS News). 
Therefore, it is necessary for the president to rely 
upon the public ratings for decisions in foreign 
policy, as if Trump were to conduct attacks 
without authorization, his public approval rating 
would be greatly damaged. The American public 
has succeeded in attributing a greater importance 
to their opinions, as is seen through Obama’s 
proceedings. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Throughout the Syrian conflict, United States 
foreign policy has largely remained stagnant 
regarding regime change. While there is evidence 
of the United States’ goal of removing Assad from 
power, there has been very little action taken to 
reach this goal or facilitate the removal of Assad 
from Syria’s presidency. Despite the 
denouncement of the Assad regime at numerous 
points in time throughout the Syrian conflict, the 
examples of “action” taken by the U.S. are in the 
form of rhetoric or empty promises. The U.S. has 
failed to pursue any solid foreign policy plans 
regarding the deposition of Assad, under both the 
Obama and Trump administrations. The United 
States’ influence and intervention in Syria has been 
fixated on either the fight against terrorism and 
ISIS or the conflict regarding chemical weapons. 
While the U.S. has taken the initiative in certain 
circumstances and sent military officials, troops, 
and even conducted numerous airstrikes, the 
extent of foreign policy plans stop there. The 
intent to remove Assad has been in place since 
Obama’s first presidential term, and regime 
change remains possible, yet U.S. foreign policy to 
date has proved ineffective in achieving regime 
change. 
The foreign policy theories of liberalism and 
realism are inadequate answers to the question of 
why the United States has failed to depose the 
Assad regime despite the goal of Syrian regime 
change. It is clear that many of President Obama’s 
initiatives coincided with the foundational points 
of liberalism, due to his identification as a liberal 
non interventionist and his subscription to 
liberalism. This subscription in seen through his 
emphasis on diplomatic negotiations with the 
Assad regime and the lack of military strikes 
conducted in Syria. Liberalism can further explain 
his hesitancy to facilitate regime change in Syria 
due to the necessity to use power politics and rely 
upon military strength, elements of the theory of 
realism. While the influence of the theory of 
liberalism is partially responsible for the lack of 
military intervention in Syria during Obama’s 
terms, liberalism cannot account for the inaction 
during the Trump presidency. Therefore, 
liberalism is rejected as the determining factor and 
answer to the inaction of the United States in 
deposing Assad from power in Syria. 
Despite Trump’s subscription to realism and 
his emphasis on power politics, the United States 
has abandoned the promise to remove Assad. 
Trump has not hesitated in using military force 
against the Syrian regime in response to prolonged 
chemical weapons attacks by the Assad 
administration. Trump has also denounced 
Assad’s actions and reiterated his interest in 
punishing and reforming the Assad regime. 
Despite, Trump’s emphasis on power and military 
intervention, the Assad regime remains in the 
same state as during Obama’s presidential terms. 
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In fact, Trump’s failure to facilitate Syrian regime 
change directly contrasts with his subscription to 
realism. Therefore, both realism and liberalism 
cannot completely account for the inaction 
inherent in U.S. foreign policy towards Syria. 
Due to the drastic difference in subscription to 
theories of foreign policy between Obama’s 
presidential terms and Trump’s presidency, the 
common denominator between the two sheds light 
on answering the overarching question of the 
paper. The common factor between the 
presidencies, and answer to the question of Syrian 
regime change, is public opinion. While liberalism 
and realism have shaped United States foreign 
policy, the reason the U.S. has not pursued the 
deposition of Assad, is due to the over-arching 
effect of public opinion. Throughout the three 
presidential terms, public opinion remains largely 
opposed to large-scale military intervention in 
Syria, including regime change. Obama and 
Trump were both aware of the public opinions 
regarding Syria, shaping their foreign policy plans 
and their administration’s actions. Because public 
polls repeatedly emphasized the hostility towards 
military intervention, the idea of regime change in 
and of itself was deemed implausible due to the 
public outcry it would provoke. The publicity 
surrounding the Syrian conflict from its 
origination has made Assad’s regime a forefront 
issue, one that both Obama and Trump have 
recognized warrants extreme precision and care in 
proceedings. The findings of this paper conclude 
that public opinion is the determining factor in 
explaining the United States inaction in pursuing 
regime change in Syria, due to the majority public 
opposition to regime change.  
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